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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Victims of corporal punishment in public schools have challenged the 
infliction of their resulting injuries under a variety of constitutional provisions, 
specifically, the Eighth Amendment, the procedural-due-process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the substantive-due-process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment. In Ingraham v. Wright,1 the Supreme 
Court foreclosed the Eighth Amendment argument and minimized the 
possibilities for a successful procedural-due-process claim.2 Yet because the 
Court denied certiorari of the Ingraham plaintiffs’ substantive-due-process 
claim,3 later litigants turned to substantive due process for protection against 
excessive corporal punishment. With no guidance from the Supreme Court, the 
majority of the circuit courts4 confronted with these claims determined that 
excessive corporal punishment can violate substantive due process, but only if 
the punishment meets an exceptionally high standard. 
Recently, in several cases challenging excessive corporal punishment, the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits strayed from the substantive-due-process 
framework and evaluated the school officials’ conduct under the Fourth 
Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard, which was developed and applied to 
the public-school setting in New Jersey v. T.L.O.5 This note will document the 
deficiencies of a substantive-due-process challenge to excessive corporal 
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 1. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 2. Id. at 683. 
 3. Id. at 679 n.47. 
 4. Only the First and D.C. Circuits have yet to settle the issue of if and at what point excessive 
corporal punishment is constitutionally impermissible. 
 5. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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punishment and offer support for the emerging Fourth Amendment analysis 
that may provide litigants with an infrequently received remedy. 
II 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
A. Ingraham, the Eighth Amendment, and Procedural Due Process 
In 1971, James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews, two Florida junior-high-
school students, challenged the use of disciplinary corporal punishment in the 
Dade County public schools.6 Ingraham was subjected to more than twenty 
“licks” with a paddle after he was slow to respond to a teacher’s instructions.7 
The beating was so severe that he suffered a hematoma and missed several days 
of school after the incident. Andrews was paddled several times, and, after 
being struck on his arms, he was unable to use one of his arms for a full week. 
Their case challenging corporal punishment, Ingraham v. Wright,8 was 
ultimately heard by the United States Supreme Court.9  Noting that the 
instances of paddling were “exceptionally harsh,”10 the Court nevertheless 
denied the students’ constitutional claims.11 In response to the plaintiffs’ Eighth 
Amendment challenge,12 the Court reviewed the Amendment’s historical roots 
and determined that its protection was limited to those convicted of crimes; 
thus, school children paddled as a means of maintaining discipline could not 
avail themselves of Eighth Amendment protection.13 Additionally, the Court 
held that the procedural safeguards available under Florida common law14 
“considered in light of the openness of the school environment” were sufficient 
to afford procedural due process.15 Further procedural safeguards, such as prior 
notice or a hearing, were not required by the due-process clause because 
“[s]uch a universal constitutional requirement would significantly burden the 
 
 6. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653. 
 7. Id. at 657. 
 8. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 9. Id. at 683. The plaintiffs challenged the corporal punishment on Eighth Amendment, 
procedural-due-process, and substantive-due-process grounds. See discussion infra II.B.1 for a brief 
summary of the distinction between a procedural-due-process challenge and a substantive-due-process 
challenge. 
 10. Id. at 657. 
 11. Id. at 683. 
 12. The Eighth Amendment states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
 13. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664. 
 14. Under Florida law, the teacher and the principal must first decide “whether corporal 
punishment is reasonably necessary under the circumstances in order to discipline a child who has 
misbehaved.” However, the teacher and the principal “must exercise prudence and restraint” because if 
the punishment inflicted “is later found to have been excessive—not reasonably believed at the time to 
be necessary for the child’s discipline or training—the school authorities inflicting it may be held 
liable,” both civilly and criminally. Id. at 676–77. 
 15. Id. at 678, 682. 
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use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure.”16 Finally, the Court 
denied certiorari on the issue of “whether or under what circumstances” such 
punishment of a public-school child could give rise to a substantive-due-process 
claim.17 Consequently, the circuit courts were left to resolve this question. 
B. Substantive Due Process 
1. Substantive Due Process and Section 1983 
The Due-Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provides 
that neither the United States nor state governments shall deprive any person 
of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”18 This clause imposes 
two separate limits on the government: procedural due process and substantive 
due process. Procedural due process “refers to the procedures that the 
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or 
property.”19 One example of a procedural-due-process issue concerns the type 
of notice that is required before a government takes a particular action.20 In 
contrast, the substantive component of the due-process clause “asks whether 
the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, 
or property.”21 Thus, substantive due process protects the individual against 
arbitrary government action.22 While procedural due process and substantive 
due process implicate different concerns and provide different protections, both 
are triggered when a denial of life, liberty, or property is at issue.23 In cases 
involving corporal punishment in public schools, the child’s liberty interest is 
implicated.24 
A plaintiff bringing a substantive-due-process challenge must proceed under 
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. Section 1983 provides, 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .25 
Section 1983 provides a federal forum to individuals seeking to remedy 
violations of the federal Constitution and laws committed under “the claimed 
 
 16. Id. at 680. 
 17. Id. at 679 n.47. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 19. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545 (2006). 
 20. Id. Thus, in Ingraham, the Court concluded that prior to the imposition of corporal punishment 
in the Dade County schools, notice was not required because the “practice [wa]s authorized and limited 
by the common law.” Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682; see discussion supra II.A. 
 21. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 546. 
 22. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998). 
 23. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 547. 
 24. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2008). 
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authority of state law.”26 In enacting § 1983, Congress designated the federal 
courts as the primary guarantors of civil rights and substantially altered the 
relationship between the states and the nation.27 Accordingly, Congress 
intended to provide a federal remedy for civil-rights violations regardless of the 
state remedies available. “It is no answer that the State has a law which if 
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state 
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal 
one is invoked.”28 Thus, overlapping state remedies are generally irrelevant to 
the availability of § 1983. A plaintiff might, for example, bring a § 1983 action 
for an unlawful search and seizure, even though the search and seizure violated 
the state’s constitution or statutes, and even though common-law remedies 
might be available for trespass and conversion.29 
2. The “Shock-the-Conscience” Standard 
In 1980, in Hall v. Tawney,30 the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit court 
to recognize a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a substantive-due-process 
violation when a school official abuses his or her official power through the 
unauthorized use of force on a public-school child.31 Adopting the standard used 
in police-brutality cases, the Fourth Circuit decided that 
the substantive due process inquiry in school corporal punishment cases must be 
whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need 
presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or 
unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official 
power literally shocking to the conscience.32 
Hall became an influential case in the corporal-punishment context. To 
date, the Second,33 Third,34 Fourth,35 Sixth,36 Eighth,37 Tenth,38 and Eleventh39 
Circuits evaluate public-school corporal-punishment cases under the 
substantive-due-process framework and have adopted Hall’s shock-the-
conscience standard, or something very similar to it.40 The First and D.C. 
Circuits have yet to resolve the issue, and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
 
 26. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972). 
 27. Id. at 242. 
 28. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (emphasis added), overruled in part not relevant here 
by Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658, 664–89 (1978). 
 29. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124–35 (1990) (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183). 
 30. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 31. Id. at 613. 
 32. Id. (emphasis added). 
 33. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 34. Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 35. Hall, 621 F.2d at 611. 
 36. Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 37. Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 38. Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 653–54 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 39. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 40. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Ramsey, 121 F. Supp. 2d 911, 918 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
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recently shifted from a substantive-due-process analysis to assessment under the 
Fourth Amendment.41 The Fifth Circuit remains isolated in its position that 
excessive corporal punishment does not violate substantive due process as long 
as adequate state remedies are available.42 The Fifth Circuit has consistently 
held that “injuries sustained incidental[] to corporal punishment—irrespective 
of their severity or the sensitivity of the student—do not implicate the due-
process clause if the forum state affords adequate post-punishment civil or 
criminal remedies for the student to vindicate legal transgressions.”43 The 
rationale for this rule is that state criminal and tort remedies provide “all the 
process constitutionally due.”44 
a. Cases failing to shock the conscience. Several examples illustrate the 
application of the shock-the-conscience standard in the various circuit courts. 
When a fifth grader sustained “severe bruises on the buttocks and an impaired 
gait” after being struck five times with a wooden paddle for humming in the 
bathroom, the Sixth Circuit concluded that although the teacher’s conduct was 
“unwise,” it was not “shocking to the conscience.”45 Similarly, a nine-year-old 
girl who was left “severely bruised” after being struck seven times within thirty 
minutes, did not rise to the level of “shocking the conscience,” even though 
both a doctor and a policewoman concluded that the blows she received were 
excessive.46 Nor was a teacher’s slapping a fourteen-year-old across the face 
“shocking to the conscience” even if the slap was “made for no legitimate 
purpose.”47 A teacher’s choking of an eighth-grade student “until [he] couldn’t 
breath[e],” though “inappropriate” and “untraditional,” did not rise to the level 
of a constitutional violation because “the extent of the student’s injury was no 
worse than that suffered under more traditional forms of corporal punishment 
like paddling . . . .”48 Another court characterized a teacher’s punching an 
eighth-grade student in the chest to be “overzealous,” yet the conduct did not 
amount to “shocking to the conscience.”49 Nor did a teacher’s jabbing a straight 
pin into a child’s arm, requiring the child to seek medical attention, “even 
suggest a substantive due process claim.”50 
 
 41. See infra II.C. 
 42. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 879–80 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., concurring); 
Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 43. Pruitt v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 136 F.3d 1329, 1329 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 44. Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 1990). Notably, the Fifth Circuit has not addressed 
the adequacy of the alternative state remedies available when denying children’s excessive-corporal-
punishment claims. Many of the defendant school districts and school officials may be immune from 
suit, likely leaving injured plaintiffs with no remedy at all. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 878 (Wiener, J., 
concurring). 
 45. Archey v. Hyche, Nos. 90-5631, 90-5863, 1991 WL 100586, at *1, *3 (6th Cir. June 11, 1991). 
 46. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Johnson, 710 F. Supp. 183, 186–87 (E.D. Ky. 1989). 
 47. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 719, 726 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 48. Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1334–35, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 49. Kurilla v. Callahan, 68 F. Supp. 2d 556, 557, 564 (M.D. Pa. 1999). 
 50. Brooks v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1535, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1983). 
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b.  Cases that shock the conscience. The degree of corporal punishment 
required to successfully shock the conscience is considerably more brutal. In 
Hall, the Fourth Circuit refused to dismiss a child’s substantive-due-process 
claim when her complaint alleged that “without apparent provocation” the 
teacher struck her with a “homemade paddle, made of hard[,] thick rubber and 
about five inches in width . . . across her left hip and thigh.”51 The teacher then 
“violently shoved” her against a desk where she was “repeatedly and violently” 
paddled.52 As a result of this assault, the child was taken to the emergency room 
and admitted into the hospital for ten days to treat the “traumatic injury to the 
soft tissue of the left hip and thigh, trauma to the skin and soft tissue of the left 
thigh, and trauma to the soft tissue with ecchyniosis of the left buttock.”53 She 
also received treatment by specialists for “possible permanent injuries to her 
lower back and spine.” She “suffered and [] continue[d] to suffer severe pain 
and discomfort.”54 
Similarly, in Webb v. McCullough, the Sixth Circuit found that summary 
judgment for the defendant principal was “inappropriate” when the principal, 
after discovering that the plaintiff and her three roommates had violated the 
school rules on a trip, became “quite angry” at the plaintiff’s refusal to let him 
into a locked bathroom.55 The principal tried to “jimmy the bathroom door 
lock,” but the plaintiff refused to open the door.56 He then “slammed the door 
three or four times with his shoulder.”57 When the door finally sprang open, it 
knocked the plaintiff against the wall. Then, the principal “thrust the door open 
again, and it struck [plaintiff] again, throwing her to the floor.”58 The principal 
“grabbed [plaintiff] from the floor, threw her against the wall, and slapped 
her.”59 In addressing the plaintiff’s substantive-due-process claim, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded that a trier of fact could find that “the alleged blows were a 
brutal and inhumane abuse of [the principal’s] official power, literally shocking 
to the conscience.”60 
In Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, the Tenth Circuit likewise denied the 
defendants’ summary judgment motion after a nine-year-old girl suffered two 
beatings at the hands of her school principal and a teacher.61 The teacher held 
her “upside down by her ankles while [the principal] struck [her] with a wooden 
paddle” five times on the front of her legs.62 When she returned to class, her 
 
 51. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 614 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 828 F.2d 1151, 1153–54, 1159 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 56. Id. at 1154. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1159. 
 61. 817 F.2d 650, 652–53 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 62. Id. at 653. 
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teacher noticed blood soaking through her clothes and discovered a “welt” and 
a “two-inch cut” on her leg that would leave “a permanent scar.”63 The next 
school year, the principal again struck the child with the paddle. After receiving 
two blows, the principal found it necessary to summon an administrative 
associate who “pushed [the child] toward a chair over which she was to bend 
and receive three additional blows.” A physician who treated the child 
commented, “I’ve done hundreds of physicals of children who have had 
spankings . . . and I have not seen bruises on the buttocks as [plaintiff] had, 
from routine spankings . . . [T]hey were more extensive, deeper bruises . . . .”64 
A nurse who examined her likewise remarked that she “would have called [the 
police department’s] Protective Services” had a child received those injuries at 
home.65 
C. The Fourth Amendment 
In 1989, the Supreme Court directed courts to analyze excessive-force 
claims under the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard instead of 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive-due-process approach.66 
“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental 
conduct, that amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due 
process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”67 In Wallace ex rel. 
Wallace v. Batavia School District 101, the Seventh Circuit was the first to apply 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection to a teacher’s use of force against a 
student.68 
In Wallace, a teacher, while trying to break up a fight between Wallace and 
another student, grabbed Wallace by the wrist to “speed her exit [from the 
classroom],” and when Wallace “bent over the desk,” the teacher “grasped her 
right elbow to move her out.”69 Wallace sued the teacher and the school district, 
alleging injury to her elbow in violation “of her Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable seizures and her Fourteenth Amendment right to 
substantive due process.”70 
The Seventh Circuit first noted that although the Fourth Amendment 
pertains primarily to the law-enforcement context, the Supreme Court in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.71 had applied its protection to searches of public-school students 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (bracketed addition in original). 
 66. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
 67. Id. 
 68. 68 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 69. Id. at 1011. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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by school officials, albeit under a different standard.72 In T.L.O., the Court 
recognized that due to the school’s “substantial interest” in “maintaining 
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds,” a search of a student’s 
property would require a lesser degree of suspicion than appropriate in the 
criminal context.73 Thus, strict adherence to the probable-cause standard is not 
required, and the legality of a search of a public-school student hinges on the 
search’s reasonableness.74 
Next, the circuit court in Wallace observed that although T.L.O. involved 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, several 
circuits had applied T.L.O.’s holding to unreasonable seizures of public-school 
students.75 Thus, T.L.O.’s reasoning was instructive—the Fourth Amendment 
seizure of a public-school student should be examined under the reasonableness 
standard “evaluated in the context of the school environment, where restricting 
the liberty of students is a sine qua non of the educational process.”76 In 
application, the reasonableness test is objective, determining “whether under 
the circumstances presented and known the seizure was objectively 
unreasonable.”77 The court explained that the reasonableness standard provides 
an acceptable middle ground, enabling teachers to deal with disruptive students 
while protecting students against the potentially excessive use of state power.78 
In applying this standard to the facts of Wallace, the Seventh Circuit held 
that the plaintiff did not suffer a constitutional deprivation of her liberty 
interest.79 The teacher’s grabbing Wallace’s elbow and wrist in order to expedite 
her departure from the classroom during a fight was “hardly . . . 
unreasonable.”80 
Turning to Wallace’s claim that her Fourteenth Amendment right to 
substantive due process was violated by use of excessive corporal punishment, 
the Seventh Circuit held that the “Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause [does not] afford[] Wallace any greater protection than the Fourth 
Amendment from unwarranted discipline while in school.”81 Excessive corporal 
punishment may be assessed under the Fourth Amendment “because a student 
is at least as much seized when a school official administers corporal 
 
 72. Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1012. 
 73. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339–40. 
 74. Id. at 340–41 (holding that Fourth Amendment restrictions placed on searches by public 
authorities were unsuitable for searches by school officials and that, consequently, school officials need 
not obtain a warrant before conducting a search of a student). 
 75. Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1012 (citing Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir. 
1989); Hassan ex rel. Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995)). 
 76. Id. at 1013–14. 
 77. Id. at 1014–15. 
 78. Id. at 1014. 
 79. Id. at 1015. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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punishment as Wallace was here.”82 Thus both Wallace’s Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims were rejected. 
The Ninth Circuit has likewise applied the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness standard to a teacher’s use of force against a public-school 
child.83 In Preschooler II vs. Clark County School Board of Trustees, a special 
education teacher grabbed the four-year-old disabled plaintiff’s hands and 
forced him to slap himself repeatedly in the head and face and slammed him 
into a chair.84 The Ninth Circuit found the teacher’s conduct “unreasonable in 
light of the child’s age and disability.”85 Furthermore, the court emphasized that 
he “posed no danger to anyone nor was he disruptive in the classroom.”86 Thus, 
the teacher’s conduct violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
excessive force by public-school teachers. 
In 2005, a Tennessee district court also concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment could apply to a “school teacher’s use of force or other displays of 
disciplinary authority to ‘seize’ her students.”87 The plaintiff, who was assigned 
to the special-education classroom, alleged that her teacher had hit her with 
“flyswatters, yardsticks, and hands,” had pulled her hair, and had required her 
to “drink water from a toilet.”88 The court concluded that the allegations could 
“justify a finding that [the teacher] used her official authority to intentionally 
acquire physical and disciplinary control over [the plaintiff] in a manner that 
was objectively unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.89 
III 
ANALYSIS 
Because Ingraham foreclosed an Eighth Amendment challenge to excessive 
corporal punishment and severely limited the possibility of a successful 
procedural-due-process challenge, litigants turned to substantive due process 
for protection. However, the adoption and frequent misapplication of the 
rigorous shock-the-conscience standard, combined with judicial hostility toward 
§ 1983 and criticism of the “amorphous”90 nature of the substantive-due-process 
clause, left many deserving children without a constitutional remedy. Yet the 
recent application of the Fourth Amendment to excessive-corporal-punishment 
challenges may provide victims with a reliable constitutional remedy. 
 
 82. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added). 
 83. Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. State of Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 84. 479 F.3d at 1178. 
 85. Id. at 1180. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Rhodes ex rel. Rhodes v. Wallace, No. 1:05 CV 1020, 2005 WL 2114080, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. 
Aug. 26, 2005). 
 88. Id. at *1. 
 89. Id. at *6. 
 90. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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A. Prisoners and Children: Unlikely Counterparts 
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit’s Hall decision, most of the circuits 
confronted with substantive-due-process challenges to excessive-corporal-
punishment cases adopted Hall’s shock-the-conscience standard—that is, 
excessive corporal punishment violates substantive due process only when the 
official’s conduct shocks the conscience. The Fourth Circuit’s unexplained 
choice to analogize corporal punishment in public schools to such incidents as 
the forcible use of a stomach pump,91 an officer’s “reckless” shooting of a 
suspect,92 and the unprovoked beating of a detainee by a prison guard93 was 
particularly surprising since the Supreme Court, in refusing to extend Eighth 
Amendment protection to the public-school context in Ingraham, had gone to 
great lengths to emphasize the differences between prisoners and school 
children.94 The Court had explained, “[t]he prisoner and the schoolchild stand in 
wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal 
conviction and incarceration.”95 
Since the Ingraham decision, the Supreme Court has continued to stress the 
substantial differences between prisoners and public-school students. In New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.,96 the Court stated that they were “not yet ready to hold that 
the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.”97 After recognizing that the Fourth Amendment principles 
developed in law-enforcement cases were unworkable in the school arena, the 
Court created a new reasonableness standard for searches of public-school 
students by school officials.98 
Other courts, recognizing the drastic disparity between public-school 
children and prisoners, have similarly refused to apply the same standard to 
such different populations. In Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia School District 
101,99 the Seventh Circuit noted the difficulties in applying the Fourth 
Amendment framework developed in the law-enforcement context to the 
public-school environment because of the stark differences between the two 
fields.100 
Deprivations of liberty in schools serve the end of compulsory education and do not 
inherently pose constitutional problems. 
This premise of a general constitutionally permissible liberty restriction is, of course, 
not the case in the law enforcement context. Seizures of individuals by police are 
 
 91. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 206 (1952). 
 92. Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1231–32 (4th Cir. 1970). 
 93. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029–30 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 94. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669–70 (1977). 
 95. Id. at 669. 
 96. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 97. Id. at 338–39. 
 98. Id. at 339–42; see discussion supra II.C. 
 99. 68 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 100. Id. at 1014. 
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premised on society’s need to apprehend and punish violators of the law. As such, 
they inherently threaten individuals’ liberty to live free of the criminal justice process. 
There is no analogous liberty for students to live free of the educational process. 
. . . 
There is little parallel . . . between the school and law enforcement situations when 
there is a seizure of the person. The basic purpose for the deprivation of a student’s 
personal liberty by a teacher is education, while the basic purpose for the deprivation 
of liberty of a criminal suspect by a police officer is investigation or apprehension. The 
application of the Fourth Amendment is necessarily different in these situations.101 
Thus, the circuit courts in both T.L.O. and Wallace recognized that the 
disparity between public education and law enforcement was too great to justify 
blind application of the same analytical framework. Although Hall predates 
both T.L.O. and Wallace, acknowledging the differences between public-school 
children and prisoners in constitutional analysis is hardly novel. But the Fourth 
Circuit’s adoption of the strict police-brutality standard for substantive-due-
process challenges to disciplinary corporal punishment guaranteed that very few 
of those claims would succeed. 
B.  Hostility Surrounding § 1983 and Substantive Due Process 
The considerable inconsistencies among courts evaluating § 1983 excessive-
corporal-punishment claims may be a product of the unwillingness of some 
judges to “constitutionalize” these seemingly state-law torts. Section 1983 is 
frequently criticized as a vehicle for bringing frivolous claims, and, 
consequently, it is cited as a source of the mounting pressure on the federal 
docket.102 
Additionally, federal judges may feel uneasy “about the prospect of federal 
courts sitting in judgment of state officials or implementing decrees compelling 
state officials to take or refrain from certain actions.”103 This concern has been 
expressed repeatedly by judges unwilling to pass judgment on the actions of 
school officials.104 
A third popular criticism of § 1983 is what it implies for federalism values—
specifically, the erosion of state lawmaking authority.105 Because a § 1983 action 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Michael G. Collins, ‘Economic Rights,’ Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 
1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1493 (1989); Henry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of 
Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985). 
 103. Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1057, 
1073 (1989). 
 104. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“[E]ducation . . . is 
primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal 
judges.”); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 1990) (avoiding “having student discipline, a 
matter of public policy, shaped by the individual predilections of federal jurists rather than by state 
lawmakers and local officials”). 
 105. See, e.g., Blackmun, supra note 102, at 2 (noting increasing condemnation of § 1983 actions as 
“inconsistent with the thesis that federal courts not interfere with state affairs unless absolutely 
necessary”); Herman, supra note 103, at 1073 (“[F]ederal court adjudication of section 1983 claims is 
frequently seen as potentially or actually intrusive upon the states’ power.”); Christina Whitman, 
MITCHELL 10/12/2010 11:56:53 AM 
332 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:321 
is frequently redundant of a state tort suit, dismissing the federal cause of action 
may be an attractive option for a federal court and a signal to future litigants to 
pursue these claims under state law (hence, presumably in state court). This is 
seemingly the approach the Fifth Circuit has adopted.106 
Furthermore, substantive due process is often denounced as being 
“amorphous and imprecise,”107 composed of vague standards that permit 
irresponsible decisionmaking.108 Likewise, the shock-the-conscience standard is 
notoriously ambiguous and difficult to apply.109 “Because [the shock-the-
conscience standard] is so subjective, its application will change as one federal 
judge after another struggles to apply it.”110 As described by Justice Douglas in 
his concurring opinion in Rochin v. California,111 “the rule turn[s] not on the 
Constitution but on the idiosyncrasies of the judges who sit here.”112 
Consequently, criticism surrounding § 1983, together with the vague notion 
of substantive due process and the haphazard application of the shock-the-
conscience standard, shrink the success rate of substantive-due-process 
challenges to excessive corporal punishment.113 
C. The Misapplication of the Shock-the-Conscience Standard 
1. An Arbitrary Comparative Exercise 
Although Hall’s shock-the-conscience standard calls for balancing the 
severity of the injury with the need presented, courts tend to focus only on the 
severity of the plaintiff’s injury. Thus, courts are simply comparing the 
seriousness of the beatings with those suffered by previous plaintiffs. Due to the 
“unduly restrictive standard”114 adopted by the circuits, this comparative 
exercise results in successful constitutional claims for only the most viciously 
attacked children. 
Notably, several courts have used the punishment inflicted in Ingraham, in 
which one child was held over a table and struck more than twenty times with a 
two-foot long wooden paddle, as a benchmark in determining whether certain 
punitive conduct is shocking to the conscience.115 Doing so is clearly incorrect, 
 
Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 30 (1980) (arguing that actions under § 1983 actions “results 
inevitably in the displacement of state lawmaking authority by the federal government”). 
 106. See Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 107. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 108. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
 109. Radecki v. Barela, 945 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.N.M. 1996). 
 110. Id. 
 111. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 112. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J. concurring). 
 113. See cases cited supra II.B.2.a. 
 114. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power through Substantive Due 
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 575 (2008). 
 115. Brooks v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1983) (“[T]wenty licks with 
a two-foot-long paddle causing a severe hematoma and loss of the use of an arm for a week did not 
shock the conscience of the United States Supreme Court in Ingraham.”); see also Brown ex rel. Brown 
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for in Ingraham the Supreme Court addressed neither a substantive-due-
process standard nor whether the punishment was shocking to the conscience.116 
The Fifth Circuit in Ingraham—without employing a shock-the-conscience 
standard—had concluded that the plaintiffs were not deprived of their 
substantive-due-process rights,117 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
that issue.118 So one cannot conclude that the Court agreed with the Fifth 
Circuit’s analysis.119 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that a district court 
comparing corporal-punishment facts to those in Ingraham erred in doing so: 
[T]he court [in Brown v. Johnson] repeatedly suggested that in Ingraham v. Wright 
“the Supreme Court found that a severe beating [20 licks with a paddle] and the 
resulting hematoma [which required the plaintiff to miss 11 days of school] did not 
shock its conscience.” [T]he Brown court’s reading of Ingraham v. Wright seems 
incorrect; the Supreme Court did not address the “conscience shocking” question in 
Ingraham.120 
Although comparison to the facts of Ingraham may be inappropriate, courts 
nevertheless continue to use the facts of the few cases that have managed to 
“shock the conscience” as a benchmark for measuring the brutality of the 
punishment in a case before them. Three cases that often serve as the standard 
to which courts judge the seriousness of a plaintiff’s injury, Hall v. Tawney,121 
Webb v. McCullough,122 and Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera,123 are examples of the 
level of egregiousness required to sufficiently shock a court’s conscience.124 
Using the extreme cases of Hall, Webb, and Garcia as benchmarks for when 
a school official’s conduct shocks the conscience leaves children suffering severe 
injury at the hands of overzealous school officials without a cognizable 
substantive-due-process claim because they were not treated “as brutally.”125 In 
Darden ex rel. Darden v. Watkins, the plaintiff’s fourth-grade homeroom 
teacher paddled him for failing to turn in a homework assignment.126 When the 
child told the teacher he could not find his homework, the teacher brought him 
 
v. Johnson, 710 F. Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (characterizing plaintiff’s injury as “much milder” 
than the “severe beating” that did not shock the conscience in Ingraham); Honaker v. Beverage, No. 
87-13, 1989 WL 517, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 1989) (“In Ingraham, the Supreme Court found that a 
severe beating and the resulting hematoma did not shock its conscience. In this case, [the teacher’s] 
conduct is much milder.”). 
 116. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 689 n.5 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
 117. See Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 917 (5th Cir. 1976), aff’d, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
 118. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 689 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). 
 119. NLRB v. Lannom Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 1957) (“Having in mind the oft 
repeated admonition that denial of certiorari is not to be considered as an affirmance of the ruling on 
the merits . . .”). 
 120. Saylor v. Bd. of Educ. 118 F.3d 507, 513 n.9 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Brown v. Johnson, 710 F. 
Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Ky. 1989)) (internal citation omitted) (bracketed addition in original). 
 121. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 122. 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 123. 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 124. See discussion supra II.B.2.b. 
 125. Darden ex rel. Darden v. Watkins, No. 87-5331, 1988 WL 40083, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 1988). 
 126. Id. at *1–2. 
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up to the front of the classroom, bent him over his own desk, and struck him.127 
He cried and returned to his desk. The child testified that the teacher then 
brought him up to the front of the classroom again and “gave me another lick 
and he hit me so hard he hurt my leg and I limped and bumped my back and I 
begged him not to hit me anymore, and he hit me again.”128 Later that evening, 
the child’s mother discovered the bruises and took him to the emergency room 
where the physician observed “a three-to-four-inch area of reddish-blue 
discoloration over the fleshy part of plaintiff’s left buttock.”129 In holding that 
the district court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on the substantive-due-process issue, the Sixth Circuit explained that 
“the events of the present case are easily distinguishable from both Hall and 
Webb by comparison to the level of force . . . inflicted upon plaintiff.”130 
Although the teacher’s paddling of the child may have been “unwise,” the court 
conceded, the child had not been “treated as brutally as were the plaintiffs in 
Hall and Webb.”131 
Similarly, a Pennsylvania district court dismissed a child’s substantive-due-
process claim after his history teacher, whose breath smelled of alcohol, 
“forcefully punched” him “with a closed fist” in his upper chest for failing to 
turn in a homework assignment.132 The teacher punched the child so hard “that 
the [other] students were able to hear the impact [of the blow] from their 
seats.”133 The court reasoned that the use of force in Webb had been “far more 
severe, and sustained for a longer time, than in the instant case.”134 
Furthermore, a Kentucky district court dismissed a middle-school special-
education student’s substantive-due-process claim after she was struck three 
times with a twenty-inch long paddle.135 The twelve-year-old, who had an I.Q. of 
forty-two, was “emotionally out of control” when the principal administered the 
first paddling.136 After the blow, she ran across the room, and when the principal 
attempted to strike her again, she covered her buttocks with her hands. Two 
teachers took each one of her hands and held them on the desk as the principal 
paddled her two more times. Later that day, the child complained to her father 
that her backside hurt and the father observed a “blood red [welt] across both 
cheeks of her butt.”137 Her father took her to the Kentucky Cabinet for Health 
and Family Services; an investigator took pictures of her injuries and concluded 
that abuse had occurred. A criminal charge against the principal was presented 
 
 127. Id. at *2. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at *5. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. 467 F. Supp. 2d 483, 487 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 490. 
 135. C.A. ex rel. G.A. v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 577 F. Supp. 2d 886, 888 (E.D. Ky. 2008). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 889. 
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to the grand jury. Still, in the child’s suit under § 1983, the court held that the 
principal’s conduct did not shock the conscience and distinguished the 
allegations in Garcia and Hall as “significantly more serious than those in this 
case.”138 
By simply comparing a present plaintiff’s injury with those suffered by the 
plaintiffs in the extreme cases of Hall, Webb, and Garcia, courts are arbitrarily 
denying constitutional protection to many deserving children. 
2. Misapplication of the Hall Standard 
Hall’s shock-the-conscience standard requires balancing the severity of the 
inflicted injury with the need presented.139 By focusing merely on the seriousness 
of the harm inflicted, courts are completely ignoring the second part of the 
equation-analysis of the circumstances prompting the punishment. 
For example, in Archey v. Hyche, the Sixth Circuit denied the plaintiff’s 
substantive-due-process claim as not “shocking to the conscience” because the 
plaintiff “received [only] five ‘licks’” and the teacher was “working in a school 
context with a legitimate purpose for administering the paddlings.”140 The court 
concluded simply that the plaintiff’s allegation did not “describe excessive force 
at the level of brutality required”141 without having considered whether it “was 
so disproportionate to the need presented.”142 The Sixth Circuit overlooked the 
fact that the supposed offense that triggered such punishment was merely 
“humming in the boys’ bathroom.”143 Considering the nature of the plaintiff’s 
offense in relation to his punishment, it is only reasonable to conclude that the 
need for punishment presented by a fifth-grade child humming in the bathroom 
is minimal. If the need for punishment presented by the offense is negligible, 
nearly any degree of corporal punishment will be “disproportionate to the need 
presented.”144 If the Sixth Circuit had properly employed the Hall standard, it 
would have concluded that administering five “licks” with a wooden paddle145 
was “so disproportionate to the need [for punishment] presented”146 by a child 
humming in the bathroom147 that it would have “amounted to a brutal and 
inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.”148 
Other courts employing the shock-the-conscience standard have similarly 
failed to assign proper weight to the need-for-application-of-force factor, some 
 
 138. Id. at 892–93. 
 139. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 140. Nos. 90-5631, 90-5863, 1991 WL 100586, at *3 (6th Cir. June 11, 1991). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. 
 143. Archey, 1991 WL 100586, at *1. 
 144. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. 
 145. Archey, 1991 WL 100586, at *1, *3. 
 146. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. 
 147. Archey, 1991 WL 100586, at *1. 
 148. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. 
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even opining that hitting or slapping a child “for no legitimate purpose”149 does 
not violate the child’s constitutional rights. By ignoring the “need presented” 
prong of the Hall test, a court examining a substantive-due-process claim for 
excessive corporal punishment is left comparing the severity of a particular 
plaintiff’s beating with that of a previous plaintiff. A court merely assessing the 
level of brutality inflicted is not functioning as a court charged with evaluating a 
substantive-due-process claim, but is rather functioning as a trial court charged 
with resolving a state-law tort claim.150 
D.  A Solution in the Fourth Amendment 
Because courts are misusing the shock-the-conscience standard, the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness standard may be a better fit for courts analyzing 
excessive-corporal-punishment cases. Both the Seventh151 and Ninth152 Circuits 
have embraced the use of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test in 
excessive-corporal-punishment cases. 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the public-
school arena recognizes that because the school setting “requires some 
modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a 
search,” a standard of reasonableness is more appropriate than the typical 
probable-cause standard available in other contexts.153 T.L.O. counsels that in 
order for a search to be acceptable, it must be “reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place”:154 the scope 
of the search is acceptable when it is “not excessively intrusive in light of the 
age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”155  
In a footnote to T.L.O., the Supreme Court suggested that its reference to 
“the nature of the infraction” did not suggest that judges should evaluate “the 
relative importance of various school rules.”156 Yet in the Supreme Court’s most 
recent public-school Fourth Amendment case, Safford Unified School District 
No. 1 v. Redding,157 the Court went to great lengths to assess the gravity of the 
 
 149. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Gonzales 
ex rel. Gonzales v. Passino, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1282 (D.N.M. 2002). 
 150. See Archey, 1991 WL 100586, at *3 (emphasizing that the resolution of a state tort claim “may 
well turn on whether ‘ten licks rather than five’ were excessive” but the resolution of a substantive-due-
process claim is “of so different an order of magnitude that [it] simply need not start at the level of 
concern these distinctions imply) (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613). 
 151. See Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia School Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a teacher who grabbed the plaintiff’s elbow and wrist in order to hasten her departure 
from the classroom following a fight did not unreasonably seize the plaintiff under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 152. See P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 n.4, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that students are 
protected from excessive force under either the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process clause). 
 153. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985). 
 154. Id. at 341. 
 155. Id. at 342 (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. at 342 n.9. 
 157. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
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plaintiff’s infraction. In Safford, an administrative assistant and the school nurse 
conducted a strip-search of a thirteen-year-old girl suspected of bringing 
prescription and over-the-counter drugs into school.158 The school’s policy 
prohibited “the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on school 
grounds, including ‘[a]ny prescription or over-the-counter drug.’”159 The 
assistant principal had received reports that the plaintiff was providing fellow 
students with prescription and over-the-counter pain-relief pills; he found 
several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a cigarette in the plaintiff’s 
day planner.160 When the plaintiff denied knowledge of pills confiscated from 
another student, the assistant principal directed an administrative assistant to 
take the plaintiff to the nurse’s office so she could be strip-searched for pills.161 
In declaring this strip-search unreasonable, the Court highlighted the 
“nature and limited threat of the specific drugs,” and described the drugs as 
“nondangerous school contraband.”162 Furthermore, the Court declared that the 
facts lacked “any indication of danger to the students from the power of the 
[plaintiff’s] drugs or their quantity.”163 If the Court is willing to discriminate 
between types of drugs according to their “nature” and “threat” level, as well as 
to distinguish between dangerous and nondangerous contraband, the Court is 
clearly willing to evaluate “the relative importance of various school rules.”164 
Under a Fourth Amendment analysis, then, courts can assign what they 
consider a proper weight to the magnitude of a student’s wrongdoing. 
Excessive-corporal-punishment cases should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness standard, in which consideration of the nature of 
the triggering infraction has historically been an important part of the analysis.165 
Both circuits that have used the Fourth Amendment to analyze excessive-
corporal-punishment cases have properly balanced the nature and 
circumstances of the student’s infraction with the severity of the punishment 
inflicted. In Wallace, the Seventh Circuit held that the teacher’s action in 
grabbing the plaintiff’s elbow and wrist to force her out of the classroom was 
reasonable because the teacher was attempting to break up a fight between the 
plaintiff and another student.166 In P.B. v. Koch, the Ninth Circuit held a 
principal’s conduct unreasonable because “there was no need for force” when 
 
 158. Id. at 2638. 
 159. Id. at 2639–40. 
 160. Id. at 2640. 
 161. Id. at 2640–41. 
 162. Id. at 2642. 
 163. Id. at 2642–43. 
 164. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.9. 
 165. E.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995); Gray ex rel. Alexander v. 
Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006); Bell v. Marseilles Elementary Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 883, 
889 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Kennedy v. Dexter Consol. Sch., 10 P.3d 115, 122 (D. N.M. 2000). 
 166. Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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he hit a fifteen-year-old student across the face and squeezed the student’s neck 
after hearing the student utter the words “Heil Hitler.”167 
When the need for the corporal punishment imposed is properly considered, 
an offense implicating the safety of students or teachers presents a greater need 
for punishment than a nonthreatening offense. For example, under the Fourth 
Amendment analysis, the teacher in Wallace acted reasonably when he grabbed 
the plaintiff in order to deflate a violent situation,168 whereas the principal in 
Koch acted unreasonably when he slapped and squeezed the plaintiff in 
response to a nonviolent one.169 Similarly, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. State of Hawaii 
Department of Education, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the eight-
year-old plaintiff’s “only offense” was “‘horsing around’ and refusing to stand 
still” and because there was “no indication that [the plaintiff] was fighting or 
that he posed a danger to other students,” the teacher’s conduct in taping his 
head to a tree for five minutes was “objectively unreasonable in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.”170 
In responding to an imminent, violent threat, a school official must 
immediately act to resolve the conflict. The immediacy of the situation does not 
permit the official to carefully consider the most appropriate punishment, 
whereas an official responding to a nonviolent offense, for example, a child 
humming in the bathroom, can reflect on the appropriateness of a certain 
punishment. Because courts are reluctant to judge the actions of state officials,171 
taking the nature of the threat presented into account allows courts to 
acknowledge the gravity of an emergency encounter while protecting children 
from overzealous officials. 
Finally, analyzing excessive-corporal-punishment cases under the Fourth 
Amendment will allow the Fifth Circuit to retreat from its isolated position 
without having to disrupt its strict rule of stare decisis.172 In fact, the Fifth Circuit 
has already concluded that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable seizures protects students from improper disciplinary actions.173 
Additionally, when it was confronted with a case alleging excessive corporal 
punishment in violation of both the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive-due-process clause, the court noted that because it did 
not find a constitutional violation under either standard, there was “no occasion 
to address . . . whether, under Graham, . . . the Fourth Amendment, rather than 
 
 167. 96 F.3d 1298, 1299–1300, 1303 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 168. Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1015. 
 169. Koch, 96 F.3d at 1299–1300, 1303 n.4. 
 170. 334 F.3d 906, 909–10 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 
479 F.3d 1175, 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the teacher’s slapping the four-year-old disabled 
plaintiff was unreasonable because he “posed no danger to anyone nor was he disruptive in the 
classroom”) (emphasis added). 
 171. See discussion supra III.B. 
 172. See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 876–77 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., 
concurring). 
 173. See Hassan ex rel. Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995). 
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the Due Process Clause, protects a student from the use of excessive force.”174 
Thus, a public-school student in the Fifth Circuit who brings an excessive-force 
claim under the Fourth Amendment might avoid the long line of unfavorable 
substantive-due-process precedent in that circuit and find redress in a Fourth 
Amendment challenge. 
Admittedly, the Fourth Amendment and excessive-corporal-punishment 
cases are not a perfect fit; courts so noting cite the amendment’s historical 
application to law-enforcement cases.175 The two circuits that have analyzed 
excessive-corporal-punishment cases under the Fourth Amendment disagree as 
to whether the Fourth Amendment will always be available to redress these 
injuries. The Ninth Circuit noted that there may be instances in which a teacher 
uses excessive force against a student without “seizing or searching” the 
student—rendering the Fourth Amendment inapplicable.176 In contrast, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause a student is at least as much seized 
when a school official administers corporal punishment,” the Fourth 
Amendment is clearly the proper vehicle to address these excessive-force 
claims.177 
Unlike substantive due process, the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit 
textual source of constitutional protection and has a strong historical 
foundation in the public-school context. The widespread acceptance of a public-
school student’s Fourth Amendment rights, in which a search or seizure is 
analyzed “in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 
infraction,”178 provides courts with a sound analytical framework and may supply 
the victims of excessive corporal punishment with an infrequently received 
remedy. 
E. Retreat from the Corporal-Punishment “Norm” 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.179 Thirty-three years ago, at the time of 
the Ingraham decision, the administration of corporal punishment was more 
socially acceptable—that is, more reasonable—than it is today. For example, in 
Ingraham, the Court noted that its analysis was set “[a]gainst [a] background of 
historical and contemporary approval of reasonable corporal punishment.”180 
The Court noted that only two states, Massachusetts and New Jersey, had 
 
 174. Campbell v. McAlister, No. 97-20675, 1998 WL 770706, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 1998) (quoting 
P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1030 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 175. See Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2001); see 
also Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Battavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 176. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d at 1181 n.5. 
 177. See Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1016 (emphasis added). 
 178. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 179. E.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). 
 180. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 663 (1977). 
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wholly prohibited the use of corporal punishment in public schools.181 
Conversely, according to statistics from the 2006–2007 school year released by 
the United States Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, twenty-
nine states (plus the District of Columbia) have banned the use of corporal 
punishment in public schools.182 Additionally, the number of students corporally 
punished in the United States has declined from 1,521,896 in 1976 to 223,190 in 
2006—an eighty-five-percent decrease.183 Notably, only a handful of states were 
responsible for the bulk of the punishments in 2006.184 Because the central 
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, society’s diminished 
tolerance of corporal punishment in our public schools will be a significant 
factor in the Fourth Amendment analysis. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The historical justifications for permitting corporal punishment seemingly 
no longer hold much weight. While incidences of corporal punishment are 
decreasing, they are hardly a problem of the past. Thus, some adjustment in the 
constitutional analysis of these claims is necessary because many children are 
suffering at the hands of overzealous school officials without a federal remedy. 
So long as judicial hostility to § 1983 remains, plaintiffs may find more 
receptiveness under the Fourth Amendment because it offers an explicit textual 
source of constitutional protection, rather than the “amorphous and 
imprecise”185 nature of the shock-the-conscience inquiry. Additionally, the 
Fourth Amendment has strong support in the public-school context, recently 
reaffirmed in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding,186 unlike the 
“indefinite and vague”187 character of substantive due process. 
The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard instructs courts to 
evaluate the search or seizure in light of the child’s age, sex, and the nature of 
the triggering infraction.188 These considerations provide judges more flexibility 
to distinguish between official action executed in a dangerous situation and 
action executed after further reflection. Although the shock-the-conscience test 
of substantive due process calls for an analysis of the need for the punishment 
presented, courts have neglected to engage in this scrutiny and have instead 
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 182. The Center for Effective Discipline, available at http://www.stophitting.com/index.ph 
p?page=statesbanning (last visited July 1, 2009). 
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 184. Rick Lyman, In Many Public Schools, the Paddle is No Relic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006 
(noting that in 2002, nearly three-quarters of all corporal punishment in the United States took place in 
Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee and Alabama). 
 185. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 186. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
 187. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
 188. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). 
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fixated on how badly a child was beaten—regardless of his or her alleged 
offense—resulting in only the severest beatings’ succeeding to shock the 
conscience. At a minimum, the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the public-
school context instructs that, though this environment warrants a high degree of 
judicial deference to school officials, there are still limits, and the degree of 
intrusion on a child’s liberty must correspond with the nature of the child’s 
infraction. 
